I. INTRODUCTION: MAKING THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON
Where do individuals sentenced by an international criminal court go to serve their sentence? The answer is: "it depends." It depends on which international tribunal convicted the individual, which states have entered a cooperation agreement to enforce sentences with the particular tribunal, and which state the tribunal believes provides the best fit for that particular individual. 1 Because there is currently no international prison or single location to enforce the criminal sentences imposed by international tribunals, 2 where a convict serves their sentence is of constant uncertainty.
There have been many advancements in international criminal law within the past three decades, including the development of ad hoc tribunals to try those accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. 3 The ad hoc tribunals have 3. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993) (creating an international tribunal that has the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and adopting the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (adopting the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for violating international humanitarian law diminished immunity for some of the world's most heinous crimes, excluding terrorism and human trafficking. 4 Ratification of the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), 5 ensures a permanent approach to combating international crimes: individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity will either be prosecuted in a court of law or ostracized and forced to live in hiding. 6 This new era of accountability has resulted in the international prosecutions of high profile defendants and former heads of state. 7 But, there in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 1 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor to deal with concerns regarding international humanitarian and human rights law violations); S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ ¶ 1-2 (Aug. 14, 2000) (recommending that the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement with the Sierra Leone government to create an independent special court to deal with violations of international humanitarian law).
4. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing the International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression). As noted in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, "The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime." Id.; see also Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, ¶ ¶ 15-22, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/8/43 (noting that the decision was made at the Rome Conference not to include terrorism or drug crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court due to concerns that "the inclusion of drug crimes or the crime of terrorism would overburden the Court and detract from focusing its limited human and financial resources on the most serious crimes agreed to in 1998").
5. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 1 (establishing the ICC, governed by the provisions of the statute, and granting it the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern); see also remain critical enforcement shortcomings in the current system. 8 The ICC is literally just a court, a building with judges, lawyers, and staff, with no enforcement mechanisms to secure arrests or effectuate sentences. A mere eight states have entered sentencing enforcement agreements with the ICC, none within the past three years. 9 This deficiency, while not currently posing an impediment to justice, will likely become a problem once the ICC moves beyond a handful of convictions. 10 The Assembly of States Parties to the ICC specifically addressed the lack of cooperating states for sentence enforcement purposes at its Thirteenth Session in December 2014. 11 The Bureau of Assembly of States issued a Report of the Bureau on Cooperation which highlighted the lack of enforcement agreements and the lack of recent commitment by States Parties to accept convicted individuals for enforcement purposes. 12 The Report noted that the ICC has "stressed" that ad http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.htm (indicting the former Serbian President for, inter alia, crimes against humanity and genocide).
8. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, ICC Drops Murder and Rape Charges Against Kenyan President, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ dec/05/crimes-humanity-charges-kenya-president-dropped-uhuru-kenyatta (reporting that the charges against current Kenyan head of state, Kenyatta, were withdrawn because the Prosecutor could not secure sufficient evidence against Kenyatta due to obstruction and lack of cooperation from the Kenyan government). hoc enforcement agreements, though permissible, "were not ideal." 13 Now that a permanent institution exists ready to prosecute those who are most deserving of international condemnation and punishment, it is strange that no corresponding permanent facility exists to house those convicted by the ICC. 14 Remarkably, little attention has been given to the important realities of a permanent criminal court -prisoners facing lengthy prison terms. 15 One cannot begin to comprehensively address international crime without addressing the full spectrum of prosecution, from arrest and pre-trial detention to incarceration, particularly when the primary penalty before international criminal tribunals remains imprisonment. 16 We have an international criminal court, but no coexisting international prison. 17 The maintenance of a permanent ICC requires us to assess the viability of a criminal justice system that fails to possess a centrally located, permanent prison 13. Id. ¶ 19. 14. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 621-22, 626, 642 (commenting that we must fix the shortcomings of the ICC, particularly the lack of a permanent facility to house ICC convicts); ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises Construction, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about% 20the%20court/permanent%20premises/latestnewsandcalendar/Pages/-ICC-holdsgroundbreaking-ceremony-for-Permanent-Premises-construction.aspx (lauding the construction of the ICC's permanent premises as a facility that should convey a strong image of an institution established to impart justice and combat impunity).
15. See RÓISÍN MULGREW, TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL SYSTEM 56 (2013) (noting that international criminal tribunals have the authority to impose sentences and have final say on decisions relating to release, yet rely entirely on volunteer states to carry such sentences out); Penrose, supra note 5, at 626 (evaluating major deficiencies in the ICC, including the lack of a permanent facility to house ICC convicts); Mary Margaret Penrose, Spandau Revisited: The Question of Detention for International War Crimes, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 553, 564, 580 (2000) (commenting on the problem of tribunals issuing sentences up to life in prison, which will outlast the temporary tribunals); Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12 (comparing the length and severity of sentences at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL).
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77 (listing the applicable penalties, including imprisonment for a specified number of years -not to exceed thirty yearsand life imprisonment "when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person"); Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (claiming that a world criminal court needs traditional components of a criminal justice system, such as police power and incarceration facilities, in order to be successful).
17. 18 Currently, all international tribunals rely on cooperating states to voluntarily agree to accept a particular convict. 19 The list of willing states has been short and regionalized. The ICC, much like the enforcement system utilized by the ad hoc tribunals, continues to rely on cooperating states to help arrest those indicted and, eventually, house the convicted. 20 The lack of enforcement mechanisms have plagued the various tribunals, as numerous individuals have avoided trial simply by evading arrest while others have served the majority of their sentence in a holding cell in the Netherlands. 21 Because these states' cooperation is entirely voluntary, they can reject any individual presented. 22 will have an available state to enforce its penalties once an individual is convicted and sentenced. 23 It seems unlikely that a twenty-first century international criminal justice system can successfully exist on a one-dimensional level -the maintenance of a court without corresponding police and prison enforcement mechanisms. 24 The current model is woefully incomplete, embracing the paradigm of the past, not the modern world. 25 We have abandoned the ad hoc tribunal approach, recognizing its shortcomings. We have embraced the need for a permanent international criminal justice system. 26 Why then, do we continue to use an ad hoc, cooperating states model to mete out penalties imposed by a permanent criminal court? 27 Historical deficiencies suggest the time is ripe to consider whether an international prison system is a necessary component of the nascent ICC system. 28 This 35 the realities of the situation in a povertystricken, post-conflict nation state has precluded this from occurring. 36 So, the SCSL, much like the ICTY and ICTR, "cannot directly implement its own sanctions" due solely to the lack of a functioning prison facility. 37 As a result, all SCSL convicts have been placed outside Sierra Leone to serve out their respective sentences. 38 In contrast to the modern ad hoc tribunals, the early international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo provided centralized prison space to enforce the international criminal sentences imposed. 39 Following the World War II tribunals, that space remained in the conquered territories of Germany and Japan. 40 Modernly, however, the ICC, much like the ICTY and 41 This decentralized approach to imprisonment has implications beyond mere location of prison space. The absence of a cohesive international prison system raises complications relating to family access, language difficulties, and rehabilitation, thereby potentially undermining the ultimate efficacy of international justice.
While the ICTY and ICTR initially prohibited imprisonment in either Yugoslavia or Rwanda, a domestic solution was successfully used during World War II due to the occupying nations controlling the prison facilities. This local approach has been incorporated into one modern international tribunal. 42 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC"), a United Nations-backed domestic court tasked with investigating and prosecuting crimes relating to the Khmer Rouge regime of the 1970s, has adopted a domestic sentencing approach for its convicts. 43 benefits of a common language, a common culture, and better access to family.
Perhaps recognizing the inherent limitations of a pure cooperating states model, the ICC has adopted a hybrid approach that relies primarily on willing states to house its convicts but also provides that in a given case, where no such nation state provides its acquiescence, the ICC Host State, the Netherlands, will accommodate the convict in a domestic prison. 49 The ICC's statutory design accepts there may be instances where it is impossible to secure a cooperating state placement. The creation of this safety net implicitly acknowledges that the cooperating state model offers an incomplete solution, at best, and provides further evidence that a new, more permanent system should be achieved. The lack of state cooperation was further addressed at the ICC when the Review Conference recently added the option that "imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available in the designated State through an international or regional organization, mechanism or agency." 50 What remains surprising, in light of the lack of state cooperation spanning from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC, is that the international community has not pressed the need for an alternative to the status quo. It has made no discernable movement toward a permanent international prison. The primary shortcoming of the cooperating states model is that only a small number of nation states participate, which results in a sparse, regionalized approach to incarceration. 51 51. See Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22 (stating that the Bureau only has eight States that have signed sentence enforcement agreements); Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 395 (observing that "with many of the difficulties relating to enforcement being attributable to the lack of support from states, it is perhaps time for international courts to take direct control over the implementation of their sanctions"). states have expressed willingness to receive international convicts from these international tribunals, with most accepting countries being regionally concentrated in Europe and Africa. 52 The continents of Asia, Australia, and the Americas (with the exception of Colombia) have, thus far, failed to contribute prison space or facilities to enforce internationally imposed sentences. 53 Russia, too, has withheld its cooperation from the international tribunals, though several Eastern European countries have entered enforcement agreements. 54 Simply put, the majority of the world's governments and population have decided not to cooperate. 55 Thus, part of the ICC's efficacy, assuming that prosecutions and sentences become more common, will depend on whether there are sufficient nation states willing to house, service, and rehabilitate convicted individuals. 56 56. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 378 (explaining that states must be willing to house international convicts). A criticism -not without force -is that the work of the ICC has been slow and costly. See Davenport, supra note 10 (explaining the ICC's low conviction rate and high operation cost). The ICC has been in existence for twelve years, has received approximately $1 billion in operating costs, and has two convictions to date. Id. This pace does not fortify the call for any prison, much less an international prison. See id. (stating the ICC is too expensive to justify). Rather, as David Davenport argues, this funding "would be better utilized to strengthen national and regional criminal justice" systems. Id.
been two final convictions before the ICC. 57 Both sentences are being enforced by their domestic country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through ad hoc agreements rather than in any "cooperating state" with a prior ICC sentencing agreement. 58 The ICC constricts a cooperating state's power to reduce sentences until "the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or twenty five years in the case of life imprisonment." 59 Similarly, the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals ("MICT") now uses a "rule of thumb" that convicts are eligible for early release once they have served two-thirds of their sentence. 60 But, even with the "two-thirds" approach, the governing laws of a particular cooperating state may be at odds with ICC and MICT practices. A far more predictable and certain approach would be to create a truly international prison system, so that decisions relating to release and rehabilitation are standardized for all international convicts through policies In over a decade of existence, with only two final convictions, the ICC has little current need for actual prison space. But, the permanence of the ICC, coupled with its ongoing investigations and prosecutions, suggests that more convictions will occur in the future. 63 Because war crimes and crimes against humanity tend to be carried out by large groups of people, a given conflict can produce several defendants. If this remains true, a present or future conflict could produce an abrupt uptake in convictions. If the ICC hits a critical mass of sentenced individuals, will there be a sufficient number of countries willing to accept and bear the cost of housing ICC convicts? The resolution of this question, coupled with the shortcomings in the status quo, strengthen the case for the creation of a truly international prison.
III. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE STATUS QUO

A. The Lack of Cooperating States
The ICTY, 64 case of the SCSL, the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone ("RSCSL"). 68 All outstanding business, including potential future trials which would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, has been transferred to the MICT 69 and RSCSL. 70 The most important remaining business continues to be oversight of the criminal sentences imposed by each of these ad hoc tribunals, including questions of early release. 71 Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council granted power to the MICT and RSCSL to oversee the remaining functions of the ad hoc tribunals after their respective mandates expired. 72 This obligation includes designating potential enforcement states and determining questions of pardon and early release. 73 The MICT and RSCSL, just as the ICTY and ICTR before them, maintain Practice Directions to help guide these early release decisions. 74 In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals, the RSCSL has noted in its Practice Direction that inmates are not eligible for early release prior to serving two-thirds of their sentence. 75 And, while the MICT Practice Direction suggests that domestic law in the enforcing state triggers eligibility for early release, 76 one source notes the MICT has adopted the two thirds rule as an informal governing principle. 77 As of November 19, 2014, the MICT was overseeing the enforcement of 18 sentences on behalf of the ICTY, with inmates spread over twelve countries, and twenty nine sentences on behalf of the ICTR split between only two African countries. 78 The MICT reported that sixteen ICTR convicts were serving their sentences in Mali, and thirteen more were in Benin. 79 In contrast, the eighteen ICTY convicts were all serving their sentences in European states including "Austria (1), Belgium (1), Denmark (2), Estonia (3), Finland (1), France (1), Germany (3), Italy (1), Norway (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1) and Sweden (2) ." 80 Six ICTR convicts and two ICTY convicts are still being housed at the detention units in Arusha and the Hague, respectively. 81 All existing bilateral agreements entered into by the ad hoc tribunals continue in force for the MICT. 82 The MICT, like each international tribunal preceding it, continues -somewhat in vain -to call on the cooperation of states to help secure additional agreements for the enforcement of sentences. 83 No new state that had not previously provided prison space for the enforcement of sentences to either the ICTY or ICTR has entered into a bilateral agreement with the MICT. 84 This inertia underscores the need for change, permanent change.
The lack of participating states under the cooperating states model continues to be a problem. 85 Every ad hoc court, the MICT, and now the ICC continue to call on states to aid in the enforcement of sentences, generally to little avail. 86 If states refuse to step up and accept these international prisoners, the system of international criminal justice will face a serious threat to its future endeavors. In the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties Report of the Bureau on Cooperation, the Bureau exposed the second main shortcoming to the existing model: a lack of sufficient diversity to accommodate the sentencing enforcement needs. The Report asserts: The Court would wish to have a broad range of agreements in different geographical areas and different normative regimes, so as to be ready to determine enforcements. This would allow the Court to meet the cultural and linguistic needs for sentenced persons, including for the families of the individuals concerned. 87 The continuing business of the ad hoc tribunals consumes scarce incarceration resources. 88 89 In fact, Amnesty echoed the concern first reported by the Bureau that only eight states have thus far entered enforcement agreements, with no new state entering into such an agreement in the past three years. 90 This dearth of cooperation has existed for each of the modern international tribunals, from the ad hoc tribunals to the ICC. Simply put, the cooperating states model has proven a constant struggle.
B. Conditions, Distance, Language, Security and Cultural Distinctions
A second shortcoming in the cooperating states model is the reality that the prisons made available by the few cooperating states vary dramatically from inmate to inmate. 91 The conditions, rehabilitation opportunities, and other penal issues 87. Rep. of the Bureau on Cooperation, supra note 9, ¶ 22. 88. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 374 ("Despite the statutory preference for enforcement of SCSL sentences in Sierra Leone, the host state is not in a position to accept custody of SCSL prisoners[,]" but rather must "rely on third states for the implementation of its sentences."); Hoffmann, supra note 21, at 841-42 (raising the question "whether it would not be preferable to establish a truly international prison with a set of international rules for imprisonment").
89 94 But, most germane issues are resolved locally and can vary quite dramatically from country to country and even prison to prison. 95 One would expect that the international community would strive to provide similar imprisonment conditions to those convicted of the same crime or even in the same conflict. However, the status quo depends fully on the cooperation of states that are free to receive only certain individuals and, thereafter, can place the individual in varying types of custody, which need only satisfy basic international norms. Such deviations are problematic and result in some inmates' sentences carrying harsher conditions than others. Two ICTY convicts might receive the exact same sentence of fifteen years. But, depending on the prison conditions they face, their experiences may be markedly different. 96 92. See id. at 121-22, 125-26 (explaining that international prisoners are generally "incorporated into domestic prison populations[,]" where they are evaluated under the Presidents' discretion and offered rehabilitation programs of the State).
93. Id. at 119. 94. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 106(1) ("The enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the Court and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners.").
95. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118-22 (differentiating between European countries like Norway, where inmates are housed in smaller facilities, usually including an individual prison cell, and Italy or France, where inmates generally face issues related to overcrowding and are housed in shared prison cells).
96. See id. at 120 (detailing that one ICTY convict in Finland has been allowed to serve his sentence in an "open prison," described by the author as "a facility without any walls"). One common feature of all international convicts, excepting the two ICC convicts, is that they have been designated to serve their sentences in locations far from the international convict's home nation. 97 The SCSL convicts housed in Rwanda are nearly 3,000 miles from home. 98 Even for the wealthiest individuals, opportunities to maintain relations with friends and family members imprisoned 3,000 miles away require a choice of relocation to an unfamiliar country or constant travel, which carries burdens of both time and expense. 99 As previously mentioned, the cooperating states model has resulted in seventeen different European states willing to accept ICTY convicts (thirteen of which are actually housing prisoners) and two African states, Mali and Benin, willing to accept ICTR convicts (roughly 2,700 miles from Rwanda). 100 In Europe, ICTY convicts are often integrated into the local prison population and serve side by side with individuals convicted of domestic crimes. 101 SCSL convicts, in contrast, due largely to financial support from the Netherlands, have uniformly been placed in a special prison wing in Rwanda (a location nearly 3,000 miles 97. See id. at 118 (stating that the "majority of ICTR prisoners" are designated to serve their sentences in Mali and Benin, and SCSL prisoners are designated to serve in Rwanda); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385-86 (noting the "very real risk that international sentences of imprisonment served in a decentralized system may be excessively isolating").
98. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that although the SCSL entered into an enforcement agreement with four countries, all convicts except one are serving their sentences in Rwanda).
See Jessica M. Kelder et al., Rehabilitation and Early Release of Perpetrators of International Crimes: A Case Study of the ICTY and ICTR, 14
INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1190 (2014) ("As it is more difficult for families to visit, convicts complain that is it difficult to maintain close contact with relatives or partners."). Special rules relating to visits have, however, been put in place for some international convicts, but, like all other instances of imprisonment, vary from country to country. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 120 (explaining that "national authorities may provide special treatment for international prisoners," such as Norway or France, which allow special arrangements for visiting hours "to allow the prisoners to spend as much time as possible with their family within the limited timeframe available").
100 from Sierra Leone) and are kept separated from domestic inmates. 102 Unlike domestic prisons, which can also be a great distance from one's village or town, the cooperating states model requires that family members traverse borders, not simply miles. And, for those imprisoned on the African continent, the distances between "home" and the prison facilities in Mali, Benin, and Rwanda are close to 3,000 miles away. 103 For some international inmates and their families, separation covering such vast distances has endangered the continuation of meaningful family relations. 104 Another common feature under the status quo for individuals serving their sentences abroad is that the host countries often have different languages, cultures, and customs. 105 In nearly every case, it is unlikely the international convict or his or her family will speak the language of the enforcing state, which can make communicating with guards, physicians, spiritual advisors, and prison staff problematic. Language shortcomings further limit an international convict's ability to participate in rehabilitation programs, including educational opportunities or training programs. 106 Such linguistic issues may even impair a family's ability to familiarize 102 . Id. at 118; see also Distance from Rwanda to Sierra Leone, DISTANCEFROMTO, http://www.distancefromto.net/distance-from/Rwanda/to/Sierra+Leone (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (calculating the distance between Sierra Leone and Rwanda at 2,957 miles). The lone SCSL exception for sentencing purposes has been Charles Taylor. Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118. His unique situation is discussed in the text more fully below.
103. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 118 (explaining that the ICTR sends the "vast majority" of Rwandan convicts to Mali and Benin to serve their sentences, and that the SCSL sends "[a]ll its [Sierra Leone] convicts" to Rwanda to serve their sentences).
104. See, e.g., id. at 120 (detailing a prisoner in France who "was never visited by his family for four and a half years . . . due to practical obstacles such as costs of travelling and housing or visa requirements").
105. Id. at 118. 106. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, 389 (observing that participation in prison programs "requires a high degree of competency in the national language of the enforcing state"); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (underscoring that "language barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations, inability to participate in work or education programmes [and] problems in communicating with other prisoners, prison staff or the outside world").
itself with the prison rules, thereby limiting or hampering visitation and communications. 107 If educational classes are offered only in the enforcing state's language, which most are, the international convict may find him or herself without access to otherwise available classes. 108 The inability to communicate an inmate's basic needs on a regular basis places that individual at a serious handicap during his or her incarceration. 109 Further, unless the prison provides individualized rules and regulations tailored to the inmate's native language, he or she may be unable to read governing policies or easily file a complaint or request services due to linguistic barriers in prison forms and policies. Even if a complaint is raised or a hearing held, unless the inmate is provided an interpreter, he or she may be at a severe disadvantage during the proceedings, particularly in relation to domestic prisoners.
The contrast is stark between the World War II tribunals, which housed inmates in two prisons where inmates spoke a common language, and the modern cooperating states model. 110 At Nuremberg and Tokyo, convicts remained in their home countries, close to their families and with a familiar culture and language. 111 The modern system jettisoned a local confinement 107 . See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 ("Though the procedures for arranging visits in enforcing states are public, relatives may not speak the languages in which the literature is published."); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (finding that "language barriers cause problems such as difficulties in understanding prison regulations," which inhibit the communication between prison staff and family members wanting to visit or maintain close contact with convicts).
108. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 389 (illustrating that prisoners without a "high degree of competency in the national language of the enforcing state" will be less likely to participate in the programs); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (explaining how "language barriers" effectively "negatively impact[] the prisoners' abilities to integrate in prison or rehabilitate").
109. See Penrose, supra note 5, at 641 ("One of the more important requirements of any prison setting, at least from a human rights perspective, is that inmates retain the opportunity to convey their needs and concern to prison staff.").
110. Penrose, supra note 15, at 555 & 555 n.9. 111. The International Military Tribunal was established in Nuremberg, Germany "to prosecute and punish" Nazi political and military leaders and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was created in Tokyo, Japan "to try and punish" Japanese political and military leaders. Milestones: [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] approach, due, in part, to the fact that the tribunals were a United Nations' creation, established in nation states other than where the conflict arose, and are not the product of a group of conquering allies. While the practice directions for the international tribunals regularly state the Registrar shall address the familial relations and linguistic skills of a particular convict and further mandates that the President "shall take into account the desirability of serving sentences in States within close proximity or accessibility of the relative of the convicted person," these directions have proven to be of little benefit when only a handful of states have entered enforcement agreements with the tribunals. 112 Exporting those who have been convicted by an international tribunal has proven no easy task. Róisín Mulgrew and others have argued that the cooperating states model exacerbates the conditions of confinement by sending the convicted war criminals to distant locations where the lack of family, friends, a common language or culture, and even familiar cuisine are notably absent. 113 There is an element of isolation to these incarcerations as many international convicts are placed in foreign prisons without programs or support systems tailored to their language, culture, or circumstances. 114 Even though international convicts often receive the benefit of higher living standards for their imprisonment, such protections come at the price of distance and isolation. 115 These 31, 2016); see also Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 391 (finding that familial relations are obviously far easier to maintain if an individual is incarcerated in his home State).
112. MICT Practice Direction, Designation of State, supra note 74, ¶ ¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5; Rwanda Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 3(i), 3(v), 4; Yugoslavia Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 4(a), 4(e), 5; Sierra Leone Practice Direction, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 4(i), 4(v), 5.
113. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining SCSL prisoners receive less visits from family and may experience "socio-cultural isolation"); Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190 (explaining ICTY prisoners face cultural difficulties and receive fewer visits from relatives).
114. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1190-91 (explaining the lack of rehabilitation programs tailored to international convicts).
115. See id. at 1190 ("Serving a sentence in a foreign country typically has a negative impact on the ability of prisoners to reintegrate into society as they become socially isolated in prison."). A good example of this distinction is the domestic Rwandan prisoners housed in the same facility with the SCSL convicts, but living in a separate Taylor's situation provides a concrete example of the cultural dimension and shortcomings relating to sentencing enforcement. The incident regarding Radislav Krstic, an ICTY convict, provides a similar example of the security shortcomings in the status quo. 123 
C. Security
Beyond limited access to family, friends, familiar foods, culture, and religious practices, there is evidence that security risks for these international convicts are higher when comingled with domestic inmates. 124 124. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 376-77 (explaining security risks concerning international prisoners).
125. Wainwright, supra note 123. 126. See Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 385 (explaining that the nationality of and length of sentences for international convicts may result in a high security classification because enforcing states want to prevent such prisoners from being harmed). May 2013, to receive Krstić pursuant a December 6, 2012 Polish court order. 128 The potential security issues only compound the limitations of the cooperating state model. Not only may inmates fear being sent to a distant and unfamiliar location, there is the added fear, at least for some, that other inmates within the host state will learn of their crimes and seek to inflict injurious retribution. Krstić experienced this fear and sustained injuries while housed in Britain. Charles Taylor voiced this fear, though the SCSL discounted his pleas, keeping him imprisoned in Britain. 129 Interestingly, the 3,000 mile distance between England and Sierra Leone is equivalent to the distance separating Taylor's desired placement in Rwanda from Sierra Leone. But, as Taylor's request indicates, it is not merely distance that exacerbates a sentence, but also family relations and security concerns. When assessing the best host country for a particular inmate, as we have seen with Krstić, issues relating to the international convict's security should be an integral part of the sentencing decision.
D. Rehabilitation, Release, and Reintegration
A fourth shortcoming with the status quo is the uncertainty regarding early release and the absence of appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration programs in enforcing states. 130 Because the current model relies on cooperating states and 130. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 125 (explaining that there is a lack of clear assessment criteria regarding the early release of international prisoners); see also Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1202 (explaining how early release and rehabilitation programs could be improved).
utilizes local law, in combination with tribunal consultation, for determining early release, international convicts with identical sentences may be subject to differing rules regarding early release. 131 Mulgrew notes the shortcoming with this approach: "A system that places the trigger for release eligibility with enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for discrimination due to the variation between the different domestic laws." 132 In contrast to early release, the issue of rehabilitation, apparently relevant to the ad hoc tribunals in sentencing, has largely been overlooked in international enforcement. 133 Under the status quo, international tribunals delegate rehabilitation assessments, both testing and reporting, to domestic prisons that have little experience working with those convicted of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 134 As Kelder, Holá, and van Wijk explain,
The fact that the tribunals are not actively involved in the enforcement of sentences means that the [tribunal] President relies heavily on information provided by third parties . . . . Although enforcement states have not been given any guidance on how to rehabilitate international prisoners, the President typically trusts their reports about a convicts' behaviour in prison and follows their advice in relation to the prisoner's level of rehabilitation. 135 To delegate imprisonment of war criminals to enforcing states whose penal policies target more ordinary criminals seems 131. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 26 (explaining that each State uses its own rules when deciding whether to pardon a prisoner and then notifies the MICT accordingly).
132. MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57. 133. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1179 (contending that rehabilitation has been "entirely neglected by academia and practitioners alike").
134. See id. at 1193-94 (observing that the tribunal "President seems to do little to critically asses the underlying sources submitted [by enforcing states] to demonstrate prisoners' rehabilitation").
135. Id. incongruent with the desire to treat international convicts similarly. 136 Inconsistencies in treatment will inevitably occur. Mulgrew further observes that "the enforcing state is under no obligation to make connections with post-release services in third states," thus limiting opportunities international convicts have for reintegration. 137 And, the basis for release hinges, at least partially, on the cooperating state's domestic structure for early release. 138 If rehabilitation entails reintegration into society, an international prison with personnel targeting the particular crimes covered -genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity -will far better address the unique nature of such crimes and the motivations that lead otherwise ordinary individuals to commit such extraordinary acts. 139 Kelder, Holá, and van Wijk assert that International crimes . . . are not committed by abnormal (deviant) and extraordinary people, but are instead first and foremost characterized by the fact that perpetrators commit crimes in abnormal and extraordinary circumstances. [Thus,] conventional rehabilitation programmes developed for deviant individuals aimed to reintegrate them back into society and to facilitate a crime-free life are not appropriate for international prisoners. 140 Without a permanent prison and a system coordinating parole or probation, international convicts are, in the most real sense, merely warehoused in domestic prisons. 141 International inmates serve their time and, once they are either scheduled for release or released they are given little to no reintegration 136. See id. at 1196-97 (claiming that international criminals, because of the large-scale crimes they commit, are fundamentally different than ordinary criminals).
137. Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390. 138. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 113 (explaining that the imprisonment of an international prisoner is governed by the law of the enforcement state).
139. See Kelder et al., supra note 99, at 1196-97 (discussing how persons who commit international crimes tend to come from deviant societal contexts).
140. Id. at 1197. 141. See, e.g., Mulgrew, supra note 28, at 390 (explaining that international convicts cannot "avail themselves of opportunities designed to enable prisoners 'to look for work, to make contacts with social services and to prepare for freedom'"). efforts dedicated to their successful return into society. 142 There is generally no continued oversight or custodial supervision. 143 Early release, in the current international context, typically means absolute freedom. The notable exception appears to be the RSCSL's approach granting conditional release. 144 However, in some instances, early release means an inability to return home or elsewhere. 145 The individual may no longer be behind bars, but neither is he or she necessarily free to return to their pre-incarceration life. 146 Under most domestic prison systems, inmates scheduled for release go through a process to prepare them to re-enter society, which may include graded reductions in security and increased opportunities for self-sufficiency. 147 Most domestic prison systems maintain a programmatic approach to early release, be it probation or some other form of reintegration that retains some level of continuing oversight of the prisoner. 148 But, under the current system of cooperating states model where international convicts are sent to distant locations to serve their sentences, such domestic programs are generally not available to international inmates set to leave the enforcing state upon release. 149 As Kelder, Holá, and van Wijk observe, "[i]n contrast to the domestic jurisdictions, the practice of setting conditions 142. See id. (noting that under the current system, "it seems unlikely that enforcing institutions will be able to provide meaningful support to international prisoners preparing for return to society").
143 153 To ensure that sentences are being uniformly served under similar conditions and that rehabilitation and reintegration are made part of the sentencing enforcement process, a permanent prison with attendant personnel, parole officers, and consistent rules relating to rehabilitation and early release is needed. If all international convicts are being sentenced for similar crimes, or at least crimes of a similar magnitude, there should be standardized governing principles put in to operation based on the underlying crime, independent from the nation state receiving the inmate for sentencing enforcement purposes. The current ad hoc approach to imprisonment leads to unacceptably inconsistent approaches toward rehabilitation and early release. 154. See MULGREW, supra note 15, at 57 ("A system that places the trigger for release eligibility with enforcing states lacks certainty and creates the potential for discrimination due to the variation between the different domestic laws.").
Reintegration, both through graded release and continuing oversight, is a vital component of penal policy. 155 The current model omits critical rehabilitation and reintegration structures and, thus, provides additional support for concentrating the sentencing enforcement process in an international prison system.
IV. OBSTACLES TO CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON
The creation of an international prison system, much like the creation of an international court system, presents both costs and risks. The ICC follows several ad hoc international tribunals and holds the promise of a lasting solution to addressing international crimes. These initial court efforts at the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC have all incurred extensive financial costs and burdens. 156 And, because the work of the tribunals created long prison sentences that have outlasted the ad hoc tribunals, there are the additional costs related to the MICT and the RSCSL. 157 Thus, the ad hoc tribunals may have ceased operations, but the sentences and cases still remaining have required the creation of secondary or residual courts to slowly winnow away at the remaining work still to be done. The RSCSL projects that it may need to remain in operation until 2055 to finalize all its work relating to the enforcement of sentences. 158 155. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 147, pt. III. A. (noting that the "essential aim of a penitentiary system is the reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners").
156. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 10 (raising the question whether the "I.C.C. is simply too expensive and ineffective to justify"); Gabriël 157. See S.C. Res. 1966, supra note 19, art. 1 (noting the additional costs associated with implementing the MICT); Agreement to Establish RSCSL, supra note 66, art. 3 (granting the Parties and the oversight committee the option to "explore alternative means of financing").
158. See The Mandate of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background, supra note 66 (noting that as part of its ad hoc functions, the RSCSL "will have the authority to manage requests for review from convicted persons and this function may extend until 2055"). Judges, courtrooms, and court staff are expenses that must be borne if an international court system is to function effectively. Time has provided great experience, including a demonstration of modest cooperation from nation states. From a post-World War II version of "victor's justice" to the modern ICC, which covers nearly the entire world, international courts have evolved slowly but deliberately. Perhaps then, as the world community considers the financial cost of erecting and maintaining a permanent international criminal court, 159 thought should be given to erecting and maintaining a true, permanent prison facility for international convicts.
The first obstacle will be location. Great consideration should be given to those countries and locations where construction might not be required from the ground up. Rather, a location -one that is centrally located in a politically stable country with a solid record regarding human rightsshould be selected to refine an existing structure capable of providing the highest level of service and security to international convicts. But, a complicating factor in the analysis for creating a single prison location is that our world is so enormous and diverse. What one country could house such distinctive populations supporting numerous languages, cultures, and religions? These are troubling questions that have not yet been adequately analyzed or discussed by scholars, lawyers, and judges.
A. The Costs
Much like the actual costs borne by the ICTY, ICTY, SCSL, and ICC, there will be actual costs borne by an international prison system, one involving building maintenance, staffing, and programmatic expenditures. If the convicts at the former ad hoc international tribunals or the ICC are to be held in a single location or in regional facilities overseen by a single supervising entity, a physical prison structure must either be built or remodeled. These costs involve real money, including bricks and 159. See ICC Holds Groundbreaking Ceremony for Permanent Premises Construction, supra note 14 (explaining the funding for the permanent ICC in the Netherlands).
mortar. In addition, there will be staffing needs, from wardens, to guards, to medical and religious personnel. Building and maintaining a prison is a costly endeavor. Some country, entity, international organization, or combination thereof will need to absorb the costs associated with both constructing and running an international prison.
There are costs of outfitting the inmates, creating and printing prison rules, providing guards and prison staff capable of communicating with the inmates, medical personnel and facilities, access to psychological and psychiatric services, educational and career training, access to religious and spiritual advisors, and food services capable of feeding a variety of dietary needs, and security.
And, much like the evolution from Spandau Prison in Germany, where the Allies oversaw their convicts in a conquered country, 160 to a system where cooperating states host international convicts, the trajectory suggests a need for consolidation -either to a single international prison unit or, perhaps, regional units existing under a single international prison umbrella. As set forth above, there are many notable shortcomings in the cooperating states model, from the obvious and consistent lack of cooperation to issues stemming from early release and lack of rehabilitation programs. Additionally, the distance, linguistic, and security concerns are already noted as issues under the status quo.
B. Safety and Security Issues
In addition to real financial costs, there are safety risks involved with creating an international prison. First, the risk of placing all high level international criminals in a single location, potentially with regional facilities, could increase security concerns for individuals displeased with tribunal outcomes or international justice. Because the ICC will be handling only those individuals whose crimes merit international attention, it can be expected that the crimes will stem, like those heard before the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, from internal conflicts and wars with continuing unrest in the home country. Such grouped incarceration might embolden members of one of the warring factions, or others, to target an international prison or international prison employees. What country or countries would be willing to assume the risk of housing the worst of the worst, collectively, and withstand the constant security threat such inmates pose? Is the concentration of the world's most notorious international criminals in a single location a truly workable solution? While this concentration has already occurred uneventfully, at least from a security perspective, in the Hague and Tanzania, these distant locations provided some measure of security for those angry in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or, most recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
On the other hand, the question of security might also be more easily answered in a single location where adequate exterior and interior security may actually provide greater protection to those convicted of the worst crimes known to humanity. If a single location could be selected, the concentration of individuals all posing a high security risk could be collectively addressed to minimize security breaches. Further, the location itself could provide heightened security protections against outside threats. From island selections to remote areas within numerous nation states, the issue of security poses both a risk and potential advantage in terms of housing war criminals and international convicts.
The security question naturally raises, and is tied to, the related issue of location. How does the international community address the risk in deciding where such international prison, or regional prisons, might be built and maintained? Will there continue to be European and African overrepresentation? The variation of prison facilities between poorer countries and wealthier, industrialized countries is relevant from a human rights perspective. But, giving emphasis to wealthier countries could compromise certain individuals' access to family, legal counsel, religious traditions, cultural institutions and dietary requirements by placing a prison outside the realm of travel for many families. While an international prison may not resolve these "location" issues, at least all international convicts will be similarly disadvantaged and their families on notice of where they must travel. And, if a single location is ultimately selected, families confronting visa requests and housing needs will face similar procedures for securing visits.
While location becomes relevant to ensuring safety, any selected location cannot be so remote that family, friends and others, like legal counsel, are prevented from visiting and maintaining relations with the inmate. If a new, truly international prison is to be constructed, efforts must be made to protect against recreating the flaws existing in the current system -such as isolation from friends and family. The most centralized location, with adequate transport options (bus, rail and air) should be sought. Regardless of location, there must be efforts made to make an international prison truly transnational and capable of hosting a range of nationalities, languages, religious traditions and dietary needs.
Security is a major issue, presenting both potential risks and rewards, but other demands -particularly those exposed under the status quo -will quickly require attention.
C. Creating Uniformity Among Diversity
The goal of an international prison must be to provide a standardized global response to a universal problem. An international prison will, eventually, have inmates from across the world, bringing together a cacophony of languages and cultures. The creators of an international prison will have to work diligently to ensure that no matter who is incarcerated, acceptable meals, rules and religious options are available to all. There can be no superior cultural norm -no Westernization or Easternization of treatment. There must be cultural sensitivity and, yet, common norms. This delicate balance may actually be the most daunting task facing the creation and maintenance of an international prison.
In some countries, chain gang or work requirements exist. In others, the focus of incarceration may be rehabilitation or reintegration into society as a law-abiding, even educated, citizen. But what is the penal goal of international justice? Will inmates receive funds to purchase items at a commissary? Will inmates be expected to work in jobs at the prison, as barbers, cooks and lawn care personnel? What standards of care, beyond the United Nations minimum standards, will govern? And, equally important, who will choose which norms govern? This author would delegate entirely the task of assessing both penal policies and creation of an international prison to one entity, preferably one similar to that presented below. The answers to these questions are still evolving. There appears to be a deep incongruity between the lengthy sentences issued by international tribunals with sentences served in unfamiliar countries and the goal of rehabilitative urged by human rights documents. This article does not allow for a more thorough consideration of the ultimate penal policies an international prison should adopt, but does note that centralizing international convicts in a single prison will undoubtedly lead to more fair and consistent treatment with a more uniform approach to penal policy and does argue for creation of a new entity to oversee the process.
To ensure uniform treatment for all international convicts and in a move toward creating a permanent international prison, I recommend the creation of an International Prison Advisory Panel (IPAP) staffed with prison experts from a fair cross section of the globe. The IPAP should be integrated into the current ICC and MICT bodies, thereby informing the current structure where enforcement state designations and early release decisions are made by the ICC President or appropriate RSCSL Chamber. The IPAP should address all inmate issues arising from current internationally focused courts and residual mechanisms, such as the ICC, the MICT, and RSCSL. The IPAP should prioritize the creation and maintenance of an international prison system as its focus. The IPAP's initial charter should establish goals for creating a permanent prison, creating standardized penal policies for international convicts and for staffing both a prison, inclusive of diverse rehabilitation programs, and a standardized early release program for each respective court (i.e. one standardized program for the ICC and another for the RSCSL).
The IPAP should be funded by a reliable source, either the United Nations or the ICC. If funded by the United Nations, the IPAP could also be governed by the United Nations and located at the New York Headquarters or, in the alternative, wherever the permanent prison location is. If the ICC becomes the source of funding, the IPAP can be housed at the Hague or, again, wherever the ultimate site of the permanent prison is. The IPAP should be given input in the enforcement of international sentences flowing from the ICC or any ad hoc tribunals as the international community weans itself from the cooperating states model and reliance on state input. While the current legal structure does not permit complete delegation, this author believes the legal framework should be amended to provide IPAP with some role in sentence enforcement, including input regarding early and conditional release.
IPAP is simply a concept, much like the Rome Statute was two decades ago. To bring this idea to fruition would undoubtedly require both reassessment and amendment to governing documents binding the international tribunals. But, to be effective, this idea requires complete incorporation into the status quo, not merely a subsidiary existence adding to the deficiencies of the status quo.
In terms of IPAP composition, there should be at least one representative from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and Russia or the Slavic countries. It would be advisable to include those who have had experience dealing with the housing of international convicts from the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. Countries refusing ICC membership or jurisdictional application before the ICC should not be permitted on the panel. Instead, countries whose citizens might be vulnerable to international prosecution before the ICC and other ad hoc tribunals should have both a voice and potentially representation on the IPAP. The purpose of the IPAP will be to ensure consistent treatment among internationally sentenced individuals. At present, that task of ensuring fair and humane treatment is shared by numerous entities and borne, largely, by the host nation states themselves. Because sentencing enforcement is an integral part of the criminal prosecution process, including issues relating to early and conditional release, the IPAP should be included in the process to ensure that sentence enforcements become more uniform, predictive and fair. The IPAP should have a minimum of seven and a maximum of nine individual members, with a goal of securing race, gender and religious diversity. Terms should be strictly limited to no more than three years so that no one individual or country has a hold on the ideas being discussed or programs pursued in a permanent prison facility for the international community. The terms among the panel should be staggered so that there is some level of continuity among the panel. For example, if the panel has nine members, each year there should be three positions that become vacant for three new members. An IPAP would ensure a continuing commitment to prison oversight and improvements as international law evolves.
The advantages of creating an IPAP is that this group could be responsible for all facets of creating, and ultimately, overseeing an international prison, from budgeting to prison inspections to determining policies and procedures for international convicts. Further, because past sentences issued by the ICTY and ICTR were not always consistent, IPAP should provide some guidance in the sentencing enforcement processfrom state designation to early release, even if this guidance is only placed in IPAP Advisories. The IPAP could further work with the ICC, the MICT and the RSCSL to ensure that the international community is developing an actual penal policy for those found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, not simply perpetuating the ad hoc approach to the enforcement of sentences. IPAP's greatest contribution to international criminal law, in fact, could be creating the first truly international penal policy governing international crimes. This article does not tackle the far more difficult question of what the international penal policy should be, involving choices between deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation, among others, and would think it advisable to delegate such Herculean task to the IPAP. At present, the focus appears to be on imprisonment for a term rather than imprisonment for a purpose. 161 Creating and utilizing an IPAP could help properly place imprisonment in the larger context of an international criminal system, as opposed to 161 . See generally Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 111-12, 125 (noting the general lack of uniformity of importance placed on the rehabilitation of international criminals, and the generally long sentence terms they serve). merely warehousing convicted individuals, thereby improving on the current free-floating, ad hoc system.
V. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRISON OUTWEIGH THE RISKS
One must ask why little progress has been made regarding the creation of an international prison. Is the issue safety, finances, building location(s) or simply lassitude? Has any government, committee or non-governmental organization undertaken a proper study balancing the benefits versus risks of creating an international prison? We have a clear need to address the issue of punishment and imprisonment now that we have a permanent court. 162 And, the question of where these international convicts will be housed moving forward is no longer merely a theoretical problem. The time for creating an international prison is upon us. We must act now. 163 Creating an IPAP provides one vision of a potential solution.
The time has come for a permanent prison solution. We have an international criminal court. We need an international prison. Deterrence will be furthered if the cooperation among nations is both united and permanent. The ICC should be the starting point for a larger, more permanent approach to realizing the still unachieved promise of "never again." The world deserves an international criminal court that is capable of enforcing its judgments without relying on willing or cooperating states. Prison, for a court whose sentencing options are primarily focused on incarceration, should have been a starting point, not an afterthought. The time is ripe for an international prison if, in fact, we are committed to international justice, not merely prosecutions. 162 . See Penrose, supra note 5, at 642 (noting that a permanent criminal court will require a permanent prison facility for placement of its condemned, who would best be served by the "utilization of regional facilities").
163. See Holá & van Wijk, supra note 2, at 122 (noting that forty-five percent of all international convicts have been released); ICC Res. RC/Res.3, supra note 50, ¶ ¶ 1-2 (noting that the Resolution, while again calling on States to "indicate to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons [,] " also confirms that "a sentence of imprisonment may be served in a prison facility made available in the designated State through an international or regional organization, mechanism or agency").
